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Emotions are evolved systems of intra- and interpersonal processes that are regulatory
in nature, dealing mostly with issues of personal or social concern. They regulate
social interaction and in extension, the social sphere. In turn, processes in the social
sphere regulate emotions of individuals and groups. In other words, intrapersonal
processes project in the interpersonal space, and inversely, interpersonal experiences
deeply influence intrapersonal processes. Thus, I argue that the concepts of emotion
generation and regulation should not be artificially separated. Similarly, interpersonal
emotions should not be reduced to interacting systems of intraindividual processes.
Instead, we can consider emotions at different social levels, ranging from dyads to large
scale e-communities. The interaction between these levels is complex and does not only
involve influences from one level to the next. In this sense the levels of emotion/regulation
are messy and a challenge for empirical study. In this article, I discuss the concepts of
emotions and regulation at different intra- and interpersonal levels. I extend the concept
of auto-regulation of emotions (Kappas, 2008, 2011a,b) to social processes. Furthermore,
I argue for the necessity of including mediated communication, particularly in cyberspace
in contemporary models of emotion/regulation. Lastly, I suggest the use of concepts from
systems dynamics and complex systems to tackle the challenge of the “messy layers.”
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SOCIAL REGULATION OF EMOTION: MESSY LAYERS
When I finished my PhD thesis on control of emotion (Kappas,
1989), the topic that is now commonly referred to as emotion
regulation was considered somewhat peripheral to emotion sci-
ence, but it clearly is not now (Tamir, 2011). Presently, there
is much empirical research and, in consequence, a considerable
number of publications on this subject. However, current views
focus on emotion regulation as an intraindividual process. I will
argue that there are benefits in reframing the concept of emotion
regulation. Specifically, I will discuss emotions as multi-layered
processes in which intraindividual processes are tightly coupled
and often cannot be separated from interindividual processes.
While the focus of emotion research arguably rests in the indi-
vidual, I will briefly discuss the importance of embodiment and
social interaction to prepare the key arguments of the present
paper. I will argue that social layers are not only involved in the
generation, as well as in the modulation/regulation of affective
processes, but that social emotion generation and social emo-
tion regulation can often not meaningfully be separated. This
dynamic view has consequences on how we should think of
emotion and emotion regulation, and how these should be stud-
ied. I will link the discussion of social emotion dynamics to
the notion of auto-regulation that I have developed elsewhere
(Kappas, 2008, 2011a,b) and also extend the range of social inter-
action to large numbers of individuals in cyberspace. I argue that
emotions in this sense are self-regulating using social networks
at different scales that provide not only empathic feedback but
they direct the action of others in co-evolving social emotion
cascades.
WHERE IS THE EMOTION?
Most of us think of emotions as intraindividual processes.
Evidently, emotions are subjectively very personal in nature. They
relate to who we are and how we see and interact with the world.
In fact, several theorists have pointed out a close link between
emotions and the emergence of the self and/or self-consciousness
(e.g., Damasio, 1999; Cabanac et al., 2009)—I feel, therefore I am.
This view can also be traced to formal definitions of emotions by
researchers in the area. Unfortunately, despite a long history of
research, the definition of emotions is still a point of contention
(Izard, 2010; Kappas, 2011a). However, arguably most current
theorists, as lay-people do, consider emotions private processes. I
will give a brief overview of different possibilities how to conceive
of emotions, including not only as intra- but also interindividual
processes. Some researchers have argued that emotions are social
in nature (e.g., Parkinson, 1996), but I will attempt to push the
envelope further by considering emotions also as properties of a
dyad, a group, or a collective.
Emotions provide (1) responses to external and internal events,
(2) help to anticipate situations in the future, (3) help to adapt
to events in the past, and in consequence (4) afford an impe-
tus to engage with the social and non-social world. Nevertheless,
while these processes provide an interface to the world, feelings,
physiological changes, and changes in action readiness rest sub-
jectively inside of us. In current (western) thought, emotions
are in fact located inside of the brain. This is, of course, con-
sistent with how emotions are mostly studied in experimental
psychology and neuroscience. Where else should emotions be?
However, it is important here to remember that locating emotions
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exclusively in the brain is recent—and not, for example, seeing
affect being a matter of the heart (e.g., Shweder, 1994)! As neu-
roscience shifts from its classical heritage in localizing faculties
in specific brain areas (Uttal, 2001) to a more fruitful network
paradigm (e.g., Bressler and Menon, 2010), the question emerges
how large should the (bodily) networks be that we consider rele-
vant for emotions? If the gut really plays a role in the gut feeling,
should the gut then not be part of the network?
I argue that it may often be a useful analytical convention to
locate emotions in the brain, but that at times it can be help-
ful to consider different perspectives. There is clear evidence that
peripheral processes play an important part in cognition, moti-
vation, and emotion—and this includes not only the nervous
system, but also the endocrine system (e.g., Maier and Watkins,
1998). For the purpose of presenting these two ways of conceiving
of the intrapersonal location of emotions, I will use the terms cen-
tralist (in the sense of brain-based) vs. peripheralist (in the sense
of all-body) model. Note that both terms are not used consis-
tently in the literature. The origin of the current centralist view
of emotion can be anchored in the position of different theo-
rists, particularly in the 19th and 20th century (see also Gendron
and Barrett, 2009), but is still very much dominant, for example
in current appraisal theories (see, Scherer et al., 2001; Ellsworth
and Scherer, 2003) and neuroscientific approaches to appraisal
theory (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2002). Peripheralist views are fre-
quently associated with notions elaborated by William James.
In his view (e.g., 1884), there could not be a normal feeling, or
in current terminology, subjective experience of emotion, with-
out the perception of bodily responses playing an important
part (see also Frijda, 2009). In other words, according to this
view, peripheral responses are extremely important to the subjec-
tive component—the feeling (Reisenzein et al., 1995; Dunn et al.,
2010). This is notwithstanding that the typical route of emotion
generation may pass from (1) external stimuli to (2) a percep-
tual process, to (3) the elicitation of behaviors, and peripheral
responses, back to (4) perception of these changes (Ellsworth,
1994, but also Reisenzein et al., 1995). The body, according to
this theory, is part of a regulatory loop that cannot be taken
out of the experience of emotion. Today, interest in the periph-
eralist view is associated with three lines of research, namely
(1) studies related to the facial-feedback hypothesis (see below),
(2) Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (e.g., 1999), and (3) the
wide-spread recent interest in embodied processes, not only in
emotion, but also in motivation and cognition have forcefully
revived the idea that the body has an important part to play in
emotion (Barsalou et al., 2003). In other words, while the brain
might be necessary for all mental processes it often is not suffi-
cient to explain all of, cognition, motivation, and emotion. Hence,
these can be conceived of as intraindividual processes that are
inside of me-the-body, and not just inside of me-the-brain. This is
not only a question of phenomenology, but refers to numerous
studies manipulating bodily posture, facial patterns, or temper-
ature to impact emotion-related processes, frequently outside of
participants’ awareness.
While there are conditions where peripheral bodily processes
are neither necessary nor sufficient for changes in phenomenol-
ogy (see Reisenzein and Döring, 2009), this does not render the
notion of emotion as bodily processes as useless, as there are
many situations where they are (see Ohira, 2010). Furthermore,
there are also affective behaviors or physiological changes that can
be observed objectively apart from subjects’ phenomenological
awareness (e.g., Winkielman and Schooler, 2008). In summary,
there is no question that brain activity is crucial for all affective
processes. However, it is relevant for how we conceive of emo-
tions (and emotion regulation) whether a model/theory should
include the body as an integral part of or simply provide an entry
point to (“this is where bodily feedback arrives”) emotion. I argue
that sufficient evidence has accumulated over the last decades that
peripheral processes modulate, if not jump-start affective pro-
cesses at times. Because there is a complex interplay of afferent
and efferent pathways between the brain and the periphery—even
the endocrine system (Maier andWatkins, 1998), it would appear,
from a systems dynamics point of view, problematic to reduce
these nested feedback loops within the body to a mere add-on.
There are dynamic properties that relate to the physical represen-
tation of processes in the periphery that require the body to be an
integral part of any emotion model. I will now consider whether
one can conceive of emotion as an interindividual process.
THE SOCIAL NATURE OF EMOTION
DARWIN’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
OF DISPLAYS AND FEELINGS
Central to any discussion on the social nature of emotion is
expressive behavior. A minimal consensus holds that emotions
may be accompanied by expressive behavior and that expressions
are often universally interpreted as signs of emotions (Russell,
1995; Kappas, 2003; Kappas et al., 2013). Some researchers hold
much stronger views regarding the relationship of expression,
feeling, and physiological activity—such as that there are innate
links between affect programs and specific expression patterns
and in turn the perception and interpretation of expressive
behavior (see Russell and Fernández-Dols, 1997). This notion is
arguably also a consequence of the history of emotion science.
Most current researchers would agree that a seminal point in
the scientific study of emotions was the publication of Darwin’s
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872).
It is noteworthy, that Darwin’s in-depth discussion of origins
and functions of expressive behavior was at the center of the
birth of modern emotion research (see also Cornelius, 1996). In
other words, the expression offered a different and more con-
crete approach to emotions than more abstract discussions of
feelings or motivations that might have characterized much of
the philosophical treatment of emotions pre-Darwin. Arguably,
Darwin’s observations and arguments have shaped much of the
research and theory in the time since. While expressing and
perceiving emotions seems to emphasize the social nature of
emotions, curiously enough, Darwin’s focus was not on interindi-
vidual processes. Instead, he spent many pages to explain how
specific expressions could have evolved as a consequence of other
(non-social) functional origins, such as regulating information
inflow, respiration, or the intake of food. Only toward the end
of the Expression, and frequently overlooked, Darwin mentioned
two important ideas regarding the importance of expressions in
the here-and-now. One refers to the social nature of expressions
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and the second to intrapersonal emotion-regulation effects of
controlling expressive behavior.
Since the publication of the Expression, Darwin has been
invoked many times as a key emotion theorist. For example, the
work of Paul Ekman and his collaborators in the late 1960’s of
the 20th century focused on the universality of certain expres-
sions, inspired by Darwin. Using some much-cited experimental
evidence (Ekman et al., 1969) they suggested that, for a lim-
ited number of emotions, strong universals in the expression and
perception exist. Cultural differences that can be observed are,
according to Ekman and Friesen (1969), due to learned display
rules. While some of the inferences of these researchers are con-
tested (see Russell and Fernández-Dols, 1997), there seems to be a
widely shared consensus nowadays that there are biological con-
straints that are linked to certain facial movements that over the
course of intrapersonal development are used and interpreted in
the context of idiosyncratic as well as culturally shared norms and
expectations (Scherer and Brosch, 2009; Averill, 2012; Boiger and
Mesquita, 2012, see also Fogel et al., 1992). In other words, in
this view emotional displays serve communicative purposes and
social contexts have a modulatory function. But the emphasis is
still on emotion as an intrapersonal process. This is also the view
that is predominant in much of the emotion regulation literature
(see below).
In the 1990’s, an important reinterpretation of Darwin’s view
on “expressive behavior” was suggested. Fridlund (1991, 1994)
argued that Darwin had not suggested that “expressive” behav-
ior was primarily linked to emotion, but to social goals instead.
In other words, expressive behavior, according to this view, is
not a readout of emotions, but in the shape of emotional dis-
plays serves specific purposes in interaction. Fridlund’s original
research has inspired further studies. The current reading of the
empirical data available suggests that facial behavior is associated
with emotion as well as with social goals (Hess et al., 1995; see
also Jakobs et al., 1999a,b, 2001; Parkinson, 2005)—moderated
by the actual or only implied presence of conspecifics and their
social relationships. Arguably, the notion of display rules is still
relevant (see Matsumoto, 2009), but it is not sufficient to explain
the low cohesion between what people feel, what they show, and
their physiological activation (e.g., Mauss and Robinson, 2009).
Nevertheless, few researchers focus on what emotional expres-
sions do in social context (Parkinson, 1996, 2005). Instead, in
my reading, most empirical studies on facial behavior today are
interested in using expressions as a diagnostic tool to replace
self-report of feeling states. In contrast, particularly in sociol-
ogy there is the notion that emotions serve to bind individuals
together (von Scheve and von Luede, 2005) and that individual
emotions may mark relationships (Kemper, 2011). In these con-
texts expressive behavior is part of the mechanisms that achieve
these interindividual goals. How can expressive behavior achieve
such functions?
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONS IN FACE-TO-FACE AND MEDIATED
SOCIAL INTERACTION
Darwin already hinted at the possibility of a joint process of
emotion elicitation in the interaction of mother and infant.
I have previously referred to such preverbal dyadic evaluation and
action processes as distributed affective processing (Kappas and
Descôteaux, 2003) and suggested that several appraisal dimen-
sions could be affected by manifest or imagined social context
(Kappas, 1996). For example, a child may not have enough infor-
mation to appraise whether an event or object is beneficial or
harmful and thus, the appraisal is “outsourced” to mother by
querying her expression. In other words, the cognitive process
involved in dealing with a situation here transcends an individual
brain. This mechanism involves the externalization and percep-
tion of expressive behavior that forms a bond in the face of a
particular affordance—dealing with an unclear situation. Rochat
and Striano (1999) have referred to such ontologically early social
exchanges as the cradle of social cognition.
As the child grows up, there is much to learn regarding how to
evaluate particular situations or events in order to thrive, adapt,
and in the extreme, survive (see Fogel et al., 1992). There are
apparently some types of stimuli that elicit universal behavioral
responses (such as objects approaching us with very high speed)
or attract attention (such as faces; see Kappas and Olk, 2008).
Similarly, some types of stimuli might be easily associated with
particular meanings, such as snakes or spiders when paired with
affective expressions of others (e.g., Öhman and Mineka, 2001).
However, the majority of affect-knowledge in humans will not be
linked to direct personal experience with an eliciting situation,
but to repeated and frequent exchanges with conspecifics, such
as care-givers, friends, and others where relevant information is
shared. Social sharing of emotions is prevalent in all cultures
and plays an important part in managing relations throughout
life as well as in distributing emotion-related knowledge (e.g.,
Rimé, 2009). Culture shapes these social processes in many ways.
Specifically, culture affects how to appraise a particular event or
may even impact what constitutes an emotion (see Shweder, 1994;
Cornelius, 1996; Mesquita and Leu, 2007). Furthermore, differ-
ences in language impact how a particular syndrome of affective
processes might be referred to (Wierzbicka, 2009; Kagan, 2010).
Thus, a name for a particular script might be available in one lan-
guage, but not the other (e.g., Schadenfreude in German or amae
in Japanese). There is shared knowledge regarding when to
feel a particular emotion or not (see Hochschild, 1983), or which
emotions might be desirable in a particular culture (Mesquita and
Ellsworth, 2001; von Scheve, 2012). All of these are relevant to
social regulation of emotion.
Several contemporary authors argue that in humans the
majority of emotional episodes typically occur in the context of
social interactions (see Parkinson, 2011; Boiger and Mesquita,
2012). This relates to actual interactions, implicit interactions
(e.g., Fridlund, 1991; Hess et al., 1995), or even when there is a
perceived lack of interactions (Cacioppo and Patrick, 2008). Of
particular importance for the study of these phenomena is the
distinction between the flow of affective cascades occurring in
real time and the epigenetic development and shaping of emo-
tional rules and norms (see also Fogel et al., 1992; Campos et al.,
2004; Boiger and Mesquita, 2012). Yet, both types of processes
underscore the importance of emotions as social processes. The
social shaping of emotions clearly is not only a function of expe-
riences in the here-and-now, but also part of the sharing of emo-
tions, as mentioned above in a personal context. However, social
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influences go much further than person-to-person processes. In
contemporary societies, we have to consider also mediated, and
specifically mass-mediated contexts.
Recent developments in mass communication have a strong
influence on normative processes relevant for the elicitation and
the expression of emotional episodes (Bandura, 2009). Emotion
portrayals and prototypical scripts of when a particular emotion
might be appropriate or not have been shared via printed media
for hundreds of years (see Mar et al., 2008; Hogan, 2010). Going
back further, in the context of theatre and oral history there is
an influence in the scale of thousands of years. However, it is the
development of film and television that has lead to an explosion
of the sharing of informative and normative material regarding
emotions in the 20th century (see also cultivation analysis; e.g.,
Morgan et al., 2009). In this context, there are media that are fre-
quently national (e.g., television: soap operas, tele-novelas, and
film) as well as global, such as large-scale movie productions
(which can also be distributed on TV and in cyberspace, but
that originate in the movie format and are originally distributed
for presentation in movie theatres). What is being communi-
cated ranges from concrete observable responses (e.g., Carroll and
Russell, 1997) to specific situations, to complex scripts and narra-
tives that include issues such as if A does X1 and B does X2 then
A might feel Y1 which is expressed as pattern Z1 in the presence
of B, C, and D, but pattern Z2 in the presence of E . . . etc. Just as
the infant is engaging with the physical environment in practicing
and building up categories of cause and effect loops, from child-
hood, frequent and repeated exposure to stories (socially shared,
literature, film, TV) creates and reinforces knowledge structures
regarding social interactions and particularly emotions which are
at the heart of these processes. As opposed to literature where
much imagination is required to fill in the blanks, we are now
exposed to thousands of emotional expressions associated with
specific elicitors, in specific social situations in mass media. The
impact of mass-mediatized socialization of emotion rules and
norms is likely rather under-than overestimated. In a way this is
also a social regulation of emotions by defining the expectations
and the stereotypes, but I will not focus on these slow processes
in the present context.
The recent development of cyberspace (Boyd and Ellison,
2007) has complicated matters further by blending the
boundaries between interpersonal communication and mass-
communication. For example, in the context of blogs, individuals
may share their emotional experiences with a large audience
and may or may not include the possibility to respond with
comments or other means, such as email, or messaging systems
(e.g., Thelwall and Wilkinson, 2010). In the context of forums,
exchange is part of the design, but many visitors to a forum
might lurk without ever contributing. While much of the
research on how emotions are communicated online is so far
based on text-based computer mediated communication, there
is an increasing amount of multimodal content, including the
possibility for face-to-face communication in cyberspace (Kappas
and Krämer, 2011). It is only very recently that large-scale
research has started to investigate the exchange of emotions over
thousands or even millions of online posts (e.g., Chmiel et al.,
2011).
The rapid increase in cyberspace communication, specifically
as regards the social web, is not only a technological phenomenon.
Instead, the motivation to be socially connected interacts with the
affordances of the Internet in rapidly evolving ways. Within few
years, particular media come and go (e.g., MySpace, Facebook,
Twitter), as they are differentially successful in catering to users’
social needs and desires. However, regardless of the features
of specific media, for example regarding modalities, speed, or
anonymity, it is the online sharing of emotions (Rimé, 2009)
that is common and central. Indeed, the prevalence of emotional
terms online is considerable (Harris and Kamvar, 2009). There
is no evidence that online exchanges are less emotional than
online interactions (Derks et al., 2008). Thus, it appears imper-
ative to include cyberspace in any contemporary discussion of
the social nature of emotions, even if there are still local differ-
ences in Internet availability and usage. The complex tapestry of
connecting with people that are not only geographically, but also
culturally heterogeneous, is bound to affect local and personal
norms in this and the coming decades. These developments relate
to aspects of the generation, and as we will see later, the regulation
of emotions.
In summary, there are numerous ways in which emotions are
social: (1) the situations in which emotions are elicited are fre-
quently social, (2) the contents of the events eliciting emotions
are frequently social, (3) the acquisition, and shaping of rules
and norms are largely social, (4) sharing of emotions is driven by
social needs and serves a variety of social functions. Furthermore,
(5) deficits in emotion expression or interpretation lead to social
problems (e.g., if particular expressions cannot be perceived due
to reduced vision or hearing; if particular expressions cannot
be produced due to conditions such as Möbius Syndrome, or
Parkinson’s Disease; or if attention to and interpretation of non-
verbal behaviors is challenged, such as in the context of Autism
Spectrum Disorder).
Psychologists tend to slice the world into packages the size
of individuals and occasionally see aggregates of n > 1 as sim-
ply the sum of individuals. This view of course ignores that
there are processes that occur only (1) in actual or implied
interaction and (2) due to the interaction of specific individu-
als, and that (3) in specific contexts (see also the principle of
non-additive determinism in the context of multilevel analyses:
e.g., Cacioppo and Decety, 2011). Popular concepts, such as an
angry mob, as vague as they may be, reflect that there seems to
be a conventional notion of collective emotions. At a scientific
level, there has been some interest in recent years in understand-
ing collective emotions. This does not only refer to theoretical
advances (Huebner, 2011), but also attempts to tackle the com-
plexity of empirical approaches to collective emotions (Schweitzer
and Garcia, 2010). One area where there exists some systematic
research comes from the workplace context. Here, for example,
the concept of emotional climate is particularly relevant (e.g.,
Yurtsever and De Rivera, 2010). There might also be a climate in
cyberspace which could be characterized by specific language use
(Thelwall et al., 2010) reflecting implicit norms, or the dynamics
with which emotional statements elicit emotions in subsequent
emotions (e.g., Chmiel et al., 2011). The latter is particularly
interesting because online communities are often much more
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fluid with regard to who is a member and for how long (Trier
and Bobrik, 2009). If indeed there exist emotional norms that
evolve in this context, this may be relevant for a better under-
standing of how emotion norms develop and are communicated,
because there are particular affordances for online research of
emotions. For example, large bodies of data are already avail-
able for research. In turn, this begs the questions how norms
migrate from place to place and or shape norms and behaviors
in individuals.
INTERPERSONAL EMOTIONS
Above I argued that we could think of instances, where the emo-
tion process should be located in the body as a whole. Can
we conceive of instances where the emotion process should be
considered as being truly interpersonal (Huebner, 2011)? I have
already touched upon the concept of emotional climate—this
seems to be a property of an institution which is instantiated
in the brains of people—where the probability of emotions is
skewed as a function of habitual interactions and norms. The
same people might act differently in a different context—much in
the way Goffman conceived of as roles. However, there is clearly
something that exists only in the context of the institution.
At a smaller scale we might think of a small group, such as a
family, where emotions are organized in the dynamic exchange
between the members, or at a dyadic level there exist concepts
such as attachment, or couples that clearly hint at a reality
of emerging properties of aggregates of individuals in different
relationships. The last decades of social psychology have been
characterized by studying emotions in social isolation—this is
due to two factors, (1) the dominant view of emotion regula-
tion considers responses in social isolation to be genuine and
untainted, and (2) the move from social psychology to social
cognition has focused on implicit processes that can easily be
studied in individuals in isolation. Increasingly there are calls for
paradigms that study emotions in actual social interactions (e.g.,
Fischer and van Kleef, 2010). It is not enough to discover that the
brain is social—we also need to study the brain in social contexts.
The aforementioned research in the context of behavioral ecology
(e.g., Fridlund, 1991) is a good case in point. It doesmake a differ-
ence whether someone is present, and it matters whether this is a
stranger, or a friend (Hess et al., 1995). Why is the social context
in the experiment so rarely considered? Even when using brain
imaging, it is possible to manipulate the actual social situation,
such as the work of Jim Coan and his colleagues on responses to
pain when the hand of the person is held by the partner, a stranger
or nobody—while the participant’s brain is being scanned (Coan
et al., 2006; see also Coan, 2011).
We are currently conducting experiments inmy laboratory and
in collaboration studying collective emotions in cyberspace (see
www.cyberemotions.eu). In some of the recent experiments we
had participants communicate in real time via a computer. They
were physically separated, but online connected via text-based
computer-mediated-communication. In one condition of one of
the experiments we asked participants to get acquainted with each
other, in the other we did not—this manipulation changed not
only subjective experience, but also expression and electrodermal
activation (Kappas et al., 2012) in these interactions. These are
processes that emerge in real time and they apparently scale to
e-communities of considerable size (Chmiel et al., 2011).
I suggest that we think of emotion generation and modula-
tion (below) at different levels. In this case, the emotion can be
a property of a dyad, a group, or the individual (see Figure 1).
I believe there is an added advantage in not reducing our con-
cept of emotion to whatever information enters a single brain and
conceive of social interactions as the sum of individual processes.
The word interaction is key here, as different levels of emotion
generation (and regulation) are likely to act (1) concurrently and
(2) in interaction (see also Butler and Gross, 2009). The work of
John Cacioppo and his colleagues of conceptualizing multi-level
analysis of psychological processes and behavior is particularly
helpful here (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2000). Nevertheless, I want to
emphasize that the argument I am making here is to not look
(only) at the emotions of individuals at different levels of social
aggregation, but to actually consider emotions of a group, a com-
pany, or a dyad. This does not mean that all individuals perceive
or express their emotions identically, but that there is a resid-
ual level at which the emotional processes that can be observed
exist in the interaction. Consider the metaphor of a play. When
you are watching a play, the play has a reality of its own and
is not just a place in time and space where several actors give
individual performances. A symphony is a score and complex
interactions between musicians and conductor and audience, not
a bunch of musicians acting out something in relative synchrony.
While this might be a correct statement, it does not provide
the same usefulness as the acknowledgement that the imma-
terial piece of music posesses a certain reality that transcends
individuals.
FIGURE 1 | “Onion layer” model suggesting emotions occurring at
multiple nested levels. However, while the image suggests a clean
hierarchical structure, in reality non-adjacent layers interact in complex ways
in the generation (and regulation) of affective processes. Thus a “messy
layer” model would be more appropriate as is argued later in the paper.
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REGULATION OF EMOTIONS
Not much space needs to be dedicated here regarding what is cur-
rently thought of as intrapersonal regulation of emotions, due to
the many recent publications on the issue, most of them authored
or edited by James Gross and/or his collaborators (Gross, 2007;
see also Vandekerckhove et al., 2008). Emotion regulation in this
school of thought focuses primarily on (often) voluntary efforts
to change ongoing or expected emotional episodes of individuals
via effortful cognitive and expressive processes—“the process by
which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they
have them, and how they experience and express these emotions”
(Gross, 1998, p. 275).
While emotion regulation is seen as a recent topic, most of
the current empirical work in individuals goes straight back to
Lazarus’ notion of and empirical research on appraisal and reap-
praisal from the early 1960’s (e.g., Lazarus and Alfert, 1964;
Lazarus et al., 1970; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) and Darwin’s
suggestions regarding feedback processes (Kappas, 1989) in the
19th century. With regard to expressive feedback Darwin wrote in
the conclusion of Expression:
The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it.
On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of all
outward signs softens our emotions. He who gives way to vio-
lent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not control the
signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree; and he who
remains passive when overwhelmedwith grief loses his best chance
of recovering elasticity of mind. These results follow partly from
the intimate relation which exists between almost all the emo-
tions and their outward manifestations; and partly from the direct
influence of exertion on the heart, and consequently on the brain.
Even the simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in our minds
(1872, p. 366).
This is a rather remarkable list of proposals that foreshadow
much of what current research on feedback and embodiment
suggests. Initially (e.g., Tourangeau and Ellsworth, 1979), there
was some skepticism regarding research suggesting an impact
of expressive behavior on emotions, specifically the so called
Facial Feedback Hypothesis. However, later reviews were more
positive that feedback effects from expression on subjective expe-
rience and physiology (Adelman and Zajonc, 1989; McIntosh,
1996) exists and can be reliably demonstrated empirically. These
findings are now discussed in a larger context of embodied
emotion/motivational processes, where facial and bodily move-
ments interact with affective processing (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007;
Price and Harmon-Jones, 2010). There is no doubt that Darwin
held already the view that volitional modulation of emotion
components—particularly expression, would lead to modulation
of the other components. This view is often erroneously dated
later, for example, linked to William James or other authors later
in the 20th century.
Particular interest in recent years regarded how automatic
emotion regulation processes might be (e.g., Mauss et al., 2007;
Koole and Rothermund, 2011) and to what degree emotion
generation and emotion regulation can be distinguished (Gross
et al., 2011a). I have argued in the past that these often can-
not be distinguished (Kappas, 2008) and specifically in discussing
the case of auto-regulation in the case of negative emotions
(Kappas, 2011a,b) where the actions motivated by the emotion
lead to its own termination by modifying the eliciting situation.
Given that emotions typically involve a strong motivational com-
ponent that involves modulation of the emotional state itself
(decrease, increase, change, prolong the current state), this is not
surprising. Whether or not a scientist wants to grant emotions
the power to auto-regulate depends on how thin one slices the
situation that is under study.
Consider the following scenario: a parent tells the child that
it is already late and that it would be time to go to bed. The
child starts to cry. The parent gives in and postpones bed time by
15min. The child stops sobbing and smiles through the tears. For
the sake of avoiding conceptual discussions about where the emo-
tion here might be, I will frame this scenario for three different
types of readers in three theoretical contexts: (1) having to go to
bed violates the goals of the child, it feels that it cannot influence
the situation and it starts to cry because it is sad (appraisal and
basic emotions view). (2) Understanding that the end of play time
is at hand, the child is frustrated and cries. Based on the context
and the interpretation of the situation, the parent, and possibly
the child view this as an episode of sadness (for a modern con-
structivist view see Barrett, 2011). (3) The desire to stay up leads
(consciously or unconsciously) to the strong social motivation to
change the parent’s mind (behavioral ecology). However, you slice
it—the behavior of the adult triggered an emotion/motivational
process in the child in the course of which the behaviors of the
child lead the adult to change the rules again, which in turn
modulates the emotion/motivational process. In other words,
the emotion auto-regulates itself by generating and modulating
behaviors in both participants of the interaction. To me this is
an example of auto-regulation—and it also nicely segues into the
section how emotion regulation is often social and does not often
permit to distinguish generation and regulation processes.
To be clear, I do not argue that all instances of emotion reg-
ulation could be reduced to auto-regulation. Instead, I hold that
in many instances auto-regulation serves to terminate or modify
the eliciting situation to self-terminate the emotion. In the case of
pleasant states—positive emotions—there is a tendency to main-
tain or increase aspects of the situation to maximize pleasure.
The voluntary regulation via cognitive or behavioral routes is the
exception if auto-regulation fails. For example, if going to the
dentist induces anxiety then avoiding the dentist auto-regulates
the anxiety in the moment. However, because this is dysfunc-
tional in the long-term voluntary emotion regulation strategies
are employed to follow through with the anxiogenic situation,
unless the fear is too intense. This is a case where auto-regulation
does not help the goals of the individual, but I believe that these
situations are less frequent then typically held in the literature and
that emotions take care of themselves, metaphorically speaking.
THE SOCIAL REGULATION OF EMOTIONS
The neurocultural theory proposed by Ekman and his colleagues
is particularly elegant in that it accounts for biological univer-
sals as well as cultural variants. While cultural rules modulating
expressions have been discussed already in the 19th century by
theorists such as Wundt, and indeed Darwin, it is the concept of
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“display rules” (Ekman and Friesen, 1969) that has captured the
imagination of many researchers in the field of emotion—even
appraisal researchers.
I have argued earlier (e.g., Kappas and Descôteaux, 2003) that
practical reasons would suggest that emotion regulation should
be part of emotion theories and not a tool for post-hoc expla-
nation of inconsistent findings. For example, if a given theory
predicts that individual A, confronted with Situation S should
show behavior X1 then this should allow a simple empirical test
of the theory: bring person A in Situation S, measure behavior,
and if I find X2 instead of X1, then the prediction was wrong. The
theory might need revision. However, this is not what happens
frequently in emotion research apparently. All too often behav-
ior X2 is explained ex post facto as the consequence of variability
in appraising S (appraisal theory), or X2 being the consequence
of display rules (e.g., neurocultural theory), or both. I argue that
if (1) display rules are potentially interfering with displays, and
(2) a theory is primarily regarding the relationship of displays,
feelings, and other emotional components, then (3) the rules
must be part of what needs to be modeled. Note, that the notion
of display rules is an instance of social regulation of a compo-
nent of emotion that is present in all social situations. In other
words, there seems to be a large agreement that there are social
rules governing displays in all social situations!
If Fridlund (1994) is right, then there is always a social context
that influences expressive behavior, even if humans are phys-
ically alone. This would mean that one cannot interpret any
display without taking social regulation into account. There is
no expressive behavior that is not affected by social regulation.
Furthermore, if feeling rules exist (Hochschild, 1979, 1983), then
we are almost constantly affected by beliefs of what is proper and
what is not. In fact, Scherer (2001) has embedded a comparison
with social and own norms into his popular Component Process
Model of emotion. According to this theory, every event, every sit-
uation, is also evaluated with regard to social norms. Taking these
theoretical approaches seriously implies that the social aspect can-
not be divorced from studying any emotion generation (see also
Parkinson, 1996).
If regulating displays, be they facial, vocal, or postural, impacts
subjective experience and physiology, then automatic or effortful
regulation in the sense of display rules will also affect other emo-
tional components. For example, if a culture holds that boys do
not cry then this will via feedback processes impact feeling and
physiological arousal. This is why it is important to conceive of
emotions as embodied processes. Even if the effect sizes of such
influences might be small, they might tip systems to go into par-
ticular states if they are not at a steady state. How can the social
regulation then be denied to be part and parcel of all affective
processes? I have proposed a Superlens Model of Communication
(1991; Kappas and Descôteaux, 2003) that takes imitation and
mimicry into account (see Figure 2).
If there are mimicry and imitation processes in interaction
(regardless of the role of mirror neurons; see Decety, 2010; also
Parkinson, 2011) and these in turn affect how we feel—again, it
is not conceivable to imagine emotional processes in interaction
that would not be potentially affected by social processes. Tome it
FIGURE 2 | Superlens model adapted from Kappas (1991) and Kappas
and Descôteaux (2003). Communication pathways are indicated in black,
expressive regulatory pathways in blue. Red arrows indicate objectively
measurable displays that are not transmitted/received. Yellow arrows
indicate erroneously perceived displays, for example due to stereotypes
and expectations. Encoding and decoding of affective/motivational displays
are a function of individuals’ social and cultural context that are part of
every individual. The intersection symbolizes the situationally shared
context including all aspects that affect transmission, such as distance or
noise.
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is baffling how one could even conceive of “clean” or “untainted”
emotional processes in the laboratory, or in the real world. Based
on the notion of implicit sociality we can assume that even par-
ticipants who are physically alone in an experiment are subject to
social influences and like a free monadic radical will link to what-
ever social synapse that is available, e.g., the representation of the
experimenter. Similarly, there is no situation in which an indi-
vidual could be non-cultural. Instead, there are likely situational
features that can prime and shape how culture affects mental pro-
cesses and behavior. But we are always embedded in a cultural and
social context.
In many settings more complex interaction topologies exist.
Figure 3 shows a hypothetical scenario where seven individuals
interact.
The social regulation of emotions is a messy affair to analyze.
It is all too easy to capitulate and argue that there is, speaking
exaggeratedly, simply no sense in considering everything that ever
happened as a cause of emotion and regulation. Of course not.
This sounds like a reasonable comment. However, the question
is where one should delineate the boundaries of episodes in a
way that we can really describe, explain, and possibly intervene
in real life situations. Layers are messy because they are not orga-
nized like an onion. Different layers of emotions and different
layers of regulation interact in complex ways—whether this is
the impact of cultural display rules on intraindividual regulatory
processes via facial feedback or the fact that family-idiosyncratic
use of facial gestures interacts with cultural rules when visiting
another country. Nowhere perhaps is the situation as complex
as when interpersonal communication and mass-communication
intermingle in cyberspace. Here e-communities come into being,
develop new rules of (n)etiquette that are constantly in flux and
that cause easily miscommunication. Sudden flaming wars can
easily erupt based on the subjective experience of being insulted
without any bad intention. In the past, such misunderstandings
would be considered a case of codes that are not shared between
all participants. However, considering the dynamic unfolding of
the (emotional) exchanges online can be seen as an instance of
a complex, multipersonal interaction with different goals on the
one hand, and different effects on the other. Certainly, there is
much to do here, because of the ubiquity of mediated com-
munication that is rather increasing than decreasing in years to
come.
The notion of auto-regulation holds that the “regulation” of
emotion is part of the brief of itself in a rather recursive manner.
Social regulation is one important facet of auto-regulation in that
expressive behavior not only informs others, it moves them to do
FIGURE 3 | Hyperlenses. Seven hypothetical individuals interact in a
communication structure that involves several dyads and triads—for example
in the context of a party. The color of the context circle suggests here two
different groups participating. Hence, some interactants share a more similar
context than others. The meaning of all arrows is analogous to that in
Figure 2.
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something, it biases their decisions, in this sense, negative emo-
tions can impact others with the consequence of these emotions
being terminated, as in getting support, or positive emotional
states can impact others to reinforce themselves, as in amuse-
ment or desire. In this sense we are always embedded in social
networks with different life-cycles (from the life-time of a fam-
ily, to the brief minutes of a shared bus ride) where emotions are
generated, moderated, regenerated, terminated, or reinforced as
a function of how individuals affect each other in socio-cultural
fields. It is because of this, that social layers should not (and can-
not) be ignored in emotion research and that if the function of
emotions involve their own regulation then generation and reg-
ulation of emotion are difficult to separate. Scenarios such as
this appear messy because they do not easily lend themselves
to the isolation of causes and effects that clean experimentation
demands. However, theymight help to understand the limitations
of much of present emotion research, such as the challenges of low
coherence between emotion components and the relationship of
phenomena studied in the laboratory and those observed in the
real world.
SUMMARY
I argue that there are many reasons to consider emotions not only
a property of individual brains or bodies but of couples, fami-
lies, cliques, teams, clubs, parties, companies, or e-communities.
In my mind, this is one way in which emotions can be social. To
study these types of emotions it is useful to take an interdisci-
plinary approach and collaborate with disciplines that naturally
deal not with individuals, but with larger aggregates (von Scheve
and von Luede, 2005).
In this view, it is natural that social forces are generative and
modulating—in other words, the elicitation and the regulation
of emotions are difficult to separate (see also Gross and Barrett,
2011). I have made this argument before in the context of indi-
vidual emotions (e.g., Kappas, 2008, 2011a,b), and I extend it
here to emotions of social entities. Typical counter arguments
involve cases where generation and regulation can be (somewhat)
cleanly separated (Gross et al., 2011b). However, I do not argue
that all instances of emotion that we observe, whatever the mix
of dependent measures is used, must be clearly linked to regu-
lation. What I do point out, is that there are many instances in
the classical, individual centered approach, as well as looking at
more complex social structures (Rimé, 2009), where regulation
and elicitation can best be described by nested layers of feedback
loops. Because of this, theories of emotion should include these
layers of regulation to permit the type of empirical testing that
is necessary for a theory to be scientific. If any emotion theory
is leaving regulation outside of their scope, there is no possibil-
ity to conduct proper tests regarding its validity. This calls for
more real interaction in emotion studies (Rimé, 2009; Fischer
and van Kleef, 2010). My colleagues and I have tried to achieve
this either by manipulating social context in the laboratory, or by
branching out into cyberspace and trying to assess the emotional
behavior of large aggregates of individuals in e-communities
(Chmiel et al., 2011).
Dealing with nested layers is messy because all layers can
potentially influence emotional components (e.g., facial muscle
activation). Research programs are required that can attempt to
disambiguate the interaction of these layers. On the one hand,
in the context of social neuroscience, there is much discussion
of how to deal with the mutual interrelations of different lay-
ers (e.g., Cacioppo and Decety, 2011). On the other hand, as
we start to deal with networks of people, we also need different
ideas how to deal with these dynamic systems, and this calls for
the science of complex systems (e.g., Chmiel et al., 2011; Garas
et al., 2012). Combining these two approaches might be particu-
larly fruitful in disambiguating the messy layers of emotion and
emotion regulation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Part of this research was supported by a European Union grant in
the context of the 7th Framework Programme, Theme 3: Science
of complex systems for socially intelligent ICT. It is part of the
CyberEmotions project (contract 231323).
REFERENCES
Adelman, P. K., and Zajonc, R. (1989).
Facial efference and the experience
of emotion. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 40,
249–280.
Averill, J. R. (2012). The future of social
constructivism: introduction to a
special section of Emotion Review.
Emot. Rev. 4, 215–220.
Bandura, A. (2009). “Social cognitive
theory of mass communication,”
in Media Effects: Advances in
Theory and Research, 3rd Edn,
eds J. Bryant and M. B. Oliver
(New York, NY: Routledge),
94–124.
Barrett, L. F. (2011). Constructing emo-
tion. Psychol. Top. 3, 359–380.
Barsalou, L. W., Niedenthal, P. M.,
Barbey, A. K., and Ruppert, J.
A. (2003). “Social embodiment,”
in The Psychology of Learning and
Motivation, Vol. 43, ed B. Ross (San
Diego, CA: Academic Press), 43–92.
Boiger, M., and Mesquita, B. (2012).
The construction of emotion in
interactions, relationships, and cul-
tures. Emot. Rev. 4, 221–229.
Boyd, D. M., and Ellison, N. B.
(2007). Social network sites: def-
inition, history, and scholarship.
J. Comput. Mediated Commun.
13. Article 11. Available online
at: http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/
issue1/boyd.ellison.html
Bressler, S. L., and Menon, V. (2010).
Large-scale brain networks in cogni-
tion: emerging methods and princi-
ples. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 277–290.
Butler, E. A., and Gross, J. J. (2009).
Emotion and emotion regulation:
integrating individual and social
levels of analysis. Emot. Rev. 1,
86–87.
Cabanac, M., Cabanac, A. J., and
Parent, A. (2009). The emer-
gence of consciousness in
phylogeny. Behav. Brain Res. 198,
267–272.
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G.,
Sheridan, J. F., and McClintock, M.
K. (2000). Multi-level integrative
analyses of human behavior: Social
neuroscience and the complement-
ing nature of social and biologi-
cal approaches. Psychol. Bull. 126,
829–843.
Cacioppo, J. T., and Decety, J. (2011).
Social neuroscience: challenges and
opportunities in the study of com-
plex behavior. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci.
1224, 162–173.
Cacioppo, J. T., and Patrick, B. (2008).
Loneliness: Human Nature and the
Need for Connection. New York, NY:
W. W. Norton and Company.
Campos, J., Frankel, C., and Camras, L.
(2004). On the nature of emotion
regulation. Child Dev. 75, 377–394.
Carroll, J. M., and Russell, J. A. (1997).
Facial expressions in Hollywood’s
portrayal of emotion. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 72, 164–176.
Chmiel, A., Sienkiewicz, J., Thelwall,
M., Paltoglou, G., Buckley,
K., Kappas, A., et al. (2011).
Collective emotions online and
their influence on community
life. PLoS ONE 6:e22207. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0022207
Coan, J. A. (2011). “The social reg-
ulation of emotion,” in Oxford
Handbook of Social Neuroscience eds
J. Decety and J. T. Cacioppo (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press),
614–623.
Coan, J. A., Schaefer, H. S., and
Davidson, R. J. (2006). Lending a
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 51 | 9
Kappas Social regulation: messy layers
hand: social regulation of the neural
response to threat. Psychol. Sci. 17,
1032–1039.
Cornelius, R. R. (1996). The Science
of Emotion: Research and Tradition
in the Psychology of Emotion. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of
What Happens: Body and Emotion
in the Making of Consciousness. New
York, NY: Harcourt.
Darwin, C. (1872). The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals.
London, UK: Murray.
Decety, J. (2010). To what extent is the
experience of empathy mediated by
shared neural circuits? Emot. Rev. 2,
204–207.
Derks, D., Fischer, A. H., and Bos, A.
E. R. (2008). The role of emotion
in computer-mediated communica-
tion: a review. Comput. Hum. Behav.
24, 766–785.
Dunn, B. D., Galton, H. C., Morgan, R.,
Evans, D., Oliver, C., Myer, M., et al.
(2010). Listening to your heart: how
interoception shapes emotion expe-
rience and intuitive decision mak-
ing. Psychol. Sci. 21, 1835–1844.
Ekman, P., and Friesen, W. (1969).
The repertoire of nonverbal behav-
ior: categories, origins, usage, and
coding. Semiotica 1, 49–98.
Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., and Friesen,
W. V. (1969). Pan-cultural elements
in facial displays of emotion. Science
164, 86–88.
Ellsworth, P. C. (1994). William James
and emotion: is a century of fame
worth a century of misunderstand-
ing? Psychol. Rev. 101, 222–229.
Ellsworth, P. C., and Scherer, K. R.
(2003). “Appraisal processes in
emotion,” in The Handbook of
Affective Science, eds R. J. Davidson,
K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith
(New York, NY: Oxford University
Press), 572–595.
Fischer, A. H., and van Kleef, G. A.
(2010). Where have all the people
gone? A plea for including social
interaction in emotion research.
Emot. Rev. 2, 208–211.
Fogel, A., Nwokah, E., Dedo, J. Y.,
Messinger, D., Dickson, K. L.,
Matusov, E., et al. (1992). Social
process theory of emotion: a
dynamic systems approach. Soc.
Dev. 1, 122–142.
Fridlund, A. J. (1991). The sociality of
solitary smiles: effects of an implicit
audience. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 60,
229–240.
Fridlund, A. J. (1994). Human Facial
Expression. An Evolutionary View.
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Frijda, N. H. (2009). Emotion expe-
rience and its varieties. Emot. Rev.
1, 264–271.
Garas, A., Garcia, D., Skowron, M., and
Schweitzer, F. (2012). Emotional
persistence in online chatting com-
munities. Sci. Rep. 2, 402.
Gendron, M., and Barrett, L. F.
(2009). Reconstructing the past:
a century of ideas about emo-
tion in psychology. Emot. Rev. 1,
316–339.
Gross, J. J. (1998). The emerging field
of emotion regulation: an integra-
tive review. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 2,
271–299.
Gross, J. J. (ed.). (2007). Handbook of
Emotion Regulation. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Gross, J. J., and Barrett, L. F. (2011).
Emotion generation and emotion
regulation: one or two depends on
your point of view. Emot. Rev. 3,
8–16.
Gross, J. J., Sheppes, G., and Urry, H.
L. (2011a). Emotion generation and
emotion regulation: a distinction
we should make (carefully). Cogn.
Emot. 25, 765–781.
Gross, J. J., Sheppes, G., and Urry,
H. L. (2011b). Taking one’s lumps
while doing the splits: a big tent per-
spective on emotion generation and
emotion regulation. Cogn. Emot. 25,
789–793.
Harris, J., and Kamvar, S. (2009). We
Feel Fine: An Almanac of Human
Emotion. New York, NY: Scribner
Book Company.
Hess, U., Banse, R., and Kappas,
A. (1995). The intensity of facial
expression is determined by under-
lying affective state and social sit-
uation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 69,
280–288.
Hochschild, A. (1979). Emotion work,
feeling rules, and social structure.
Am. J. Sociol. 85, 551–575.
Hochschild, A. (1983). The Managed
Heart: Commercialization of Human
Feeling. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Hogan, P. C. (2010). Fictions and feel-
ings: on the place of literature in
the study of emotion. Emot. Rev. 2,
184–195.
Huebner, B. (2011). Genuinely collec-
tive emotions. Eur. J. Philos. Sci. 1,
89–118.
Izard, C. E. (2010). The many mean-
ings/aspects of emotion: emotion
definitions, functions, activation,
and regulation. Emot. Rev. 2,
363–370.
Jakobs, E., Manstead, A. S. R., and
Fischer, A. H. (1999a). Social
motives and emotional feelings as
determinants of facial displays: the
case of smiling. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 25, 424–435.
Jakobs, E., Manstead, A. S. R., and
Fischer, A. H. (1999b). Social
motives, emotional feelings, and
smiling. Cogn. Emot. 13, 321–345.
Jakobs, E., Manstead, A. S. R., and
Fischer, A. H. (2001). Social con-
text effects on facial activity in a
negative emotional setting. Emotion
1, 51–69.
James, W. (1884). What is an emotion?
Mind 9, 188–205.
Kagan, J. (2010). Some plain words on
emotion. Emot. Rev. 2, 221–224.
Kappas, A. (1989). Control of Emotion.
Unpublished PhD Thesis. Hanover,
NH: Dartmouth College.
Kappas, A. (1991). The illusion of
the neutral observer: on the com-
munication of emotion. Cahiers de
Linguistique Française 12, 153–168.
Kappas, A. (1996). “The sociality
of appraisals: impact of social
situations on the evaluations of
emotion antecedent events and
physiological and expressive reac-
tions,” in Proceedings of the IXth
Conference of the International
Society for Research on Emotions, ed
N. H. Frijda (Toronto, ON: ISRE
Publications), 116–120.
Kappas, A. (2003). “What facial activ-
ity can and cannot tell us about
emotions,” in The Human Face:
Measurement and Meaning, ed
M. Katsikitis (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers), 215–234.
Kappas, A. (2008). “Psssst! Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are actu-
ally the same person! A tale
of regulation and emotion,”
in Regulating Emotions: Social
Necessity and Biological Inheritance,
eds M. Vandekerckhove, C. von
Scheve, S. Ismer, S. Jung, and S.
Kronast (Malden, MA: Blackwell
Publishing), 15–38.
Kappas, A. (2011a). Emotion is not just
an alarm bell—it’s the whole tootin’
fire truck. Cogn. Emot. 25, 765–781.
Kappas, A. (2011b). Emotion and regu-
lation are one! Emot. Rev. 3, 17–25.
Kappas, A., and Descôteaux, J. (2003).
“Of butterflies and roaring thunder:
nonverbal communication in inter-
action and regulation of emotion,”
in Nonverbal Behavior in Clinical
Settings, eds P. Philippot, E. J. Coats,
and R. S. Feldman (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press), 45–74.
Kappas, A., and Krämer, N. C. (2011).
“Introduction: electronically medi-
ated face-to-face communication:
Issues, questions, and challenges,” in
Face-to-Face Communication Over
the Internet: Emotions in a Web of
Culture, Language and Technology,
eds A. Kappas and N. C. Krämer
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 1–13.
Kappas, A., Küster, D., and Krumhuber,
E. (2013). “Facial behavior,” in
Handbook of Communication
Science: Nonverbal Communication,
eds J. A. Hall and M. Knapp (New
York, NY: Mouton de Gruyter),
131–166.
Kappas, A., Küster, D., Theunis,
M., and Tsankova, E. (2012).
Cyberemotions: an analysis of
synchronous computer medi-
ated communication and dyadic
interaction. Psychophysiology 49,
S49.
Kappas, A., and Olk, B. (2008). The
concept of visual competence as
seen from the perspective of the psy-
chological and brain sciences. Vis.
Stud. 23, 162–173.
Kemper, T. D. (2011). Status, Power,
and Ritual Interaction: A Relational
Reading of Durkheim, Goffman, and
Collins. Farnham: Ashgate.
Koole, S. L., and Rothermund, K.
(2011). “I feel better but I don’t
know why”: the psychology of
implicit emotion regulation. Cogn.
Emot. 25, 389–399.
Lazarus, R. S., and Alfert, E. (1964).
The short-circuiting of threat by
experimentally altering cognitive
appraisal. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 69,
195–205.
Lazarus, R. S., Averill, J. R., and Opton,
E. M. (1970). “Towards a cognitive
theory of emotion,” in Feelings and
Emotions: The Loyola Symposium
ed M. B. Arnold (New York, NY:
Academic Press), 207–232.
Lazarus, R. S., and Folkman, S. (1984).
Stress, Appraisal and Coping. New
York, NY: Springer.
Maier, S. F., and Watkins, L. R.
(1998). Cytokines for psycholo-
gists: implications of bi-directional
immune-to-brain communication
for understanding behavior, mood,
and cognition. Psychol. Rev. 105,
83–107.
Mar, R., Djikic, M., and Oatley, K.
(2008). “Effects of reading on
knowledge, social abilities, and
selfhood,” in Directions in Empirical
Literary Studies: In Honor of
Willie Van Peer, eds S. Zyngier,
M. Bortolussi, A. Chesnokova,
and J. Auracher (Amsterdam,
Netherlands: Benjamins), 127–137.
Matsumoto, D. (2009). “Culture and
emotional expression,” in Problems
and Solutions in Cross-Cultural
Theory, Research, and Application,
eds C. Y. Chiu, Y. Y. Hong, S.
Shavitt, and R. S. Wyer (New York,
NY: Psychology Press), 271–287.
Mauss, I. B., Bunge, S. A., and Gross, J.
J. (2007). Automatic emotion regu-
lation. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass 1,
146–167.
Mauss, I. B., and Robinson, M. D.
(2009). Measures of emotion:
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 51 | 10
Kappas Social regulation: messy layers
a review. Cogn. Emot. 23,
209–237.
McIntosh, D. N. (1996). Facial feedback
hypotheses: evidence, implications,
and directions. Motiv. Emot. 20,
121–147.
Mesquita, B., and Ellsworth, P. (2001).
“The role of culture in appraisal,”
in Appraisal Processes in Emotion:
Theory, Methods, Research, eds K. R.
Scherer, A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone
(New York, NY: Oxford University
Press), 233–248.
Mesquita, B., and Leu, J. (2007). “The
cultural psychology of emotions,”
in Handbook of Cultural Psychology,
eds S. Kitayama and D. Cohen (New
York, NY: Guilford Press), 734–759.
Morgan, M., Shanahan, J., and
Signorielli, N. (2009). “Growing
up with television: cultivation pro-
cesses,” inMedia Effects: Advances in
Theory and Research, 3rd Edn, eds J.
Bryant and M. B. Oliver (New York,
NY: Routledge), 34–49.
Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying
emotion. Science 316, 1002–1005.
Ochsner, K. N., Bunge, S. A., Gross,
J. J., and Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2002).
Rethinking feelings: an fMRI study
of the cognitive regulation of
emotion. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14,
1215–1299.
Ohira, H. (2010). The somatic marker
revisited: brain and body in emo-
tional decision making. Emot. Rev.
2, 245–249.
Öhman, A., and Mineka, S. (2001).
Fears, phobias, and preparedness.
Toward an evolved module of fear
and fear learning. Psychol. Rev. 108,
483–522.
Parkinson, B. (1996). Emotions are
social. Br. J. Psychol. 87, 663–683.
Parkinson, B. (2005). Do facial move-
ments express emotions or commu-
nicate motives? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
9, 278–311.
Parkinson, B. (2011). Interpersonal
emotion transfer: contagion and
social appraisal. Soc. Pers. Psychol.
Compass 5, 428–439.
Price, T. F., and Harmon-Jones, E.
(2010). The effect of embod-
ied emotive states on cognitive
categorization. Emotion 10,
934–938.
Reisenzein, R., and Döring, S. A.
(2009). Ten perspectives on emo-
tional experience: introduction to
the special issue. Emot. Rev. 1,
195–205.
Reisenzein, R., Meyer, W.-U., and
Schützwohl, A. (1995). James and
the physical basis of emotion: a
comment on Ellsworth. Psychol.
Rev. 102, 757–761.
Rimé, B. (2009). Emotion elicits the
social sharing of emotion. Emot.
Rev. 1, 60–85.
Rochat, P., and Striano, T. (1999).
“Social-cognitive development
in the first year,” in Early Social
Cognition: Understanding Others in
the First Months of life, eds P. Rochat
(Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates), 3–34.
Russell, J. A. (1995). Facial expressions
of emotion: what lies beyond mini-
mal universality? Psychol. Bull. 118,
379–391.
Russell, J. A., and Fernández-Dols, J. M.
(1997). “What does a facial expres-
sion mean?” in The Psychology
of Facial Expression, eds J. A.
Russell and J. M. Fernández-Dols
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press), 3–30.
Scherer, K. R. (2001). “Appraisal
considered as a process of multi-
level sequential checking,” in
Appraisal Processes in Emotion:
Theory, Methods, Research, eds K. R.
Scherer, A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone
(New York, NY: Oxford University
Press), 92–120.
Scherer, K. R., and Brosch, T. (2009).
Culture-specific appraisal biases
contribute to emotion dispositions.
Eur. J. Pers. 23, 265–288.
Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A., and
Johnstone, T. (eds.). (2001).
Appraisal Processes in Emotion:
Theory, Methods, Research. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Schweitzer, F., and Garcia, D. (2010).
An agent-based model of collective
emotions in online communities.
Eur. Phys. J. B 77, 533–545.
Shweder, R. A. (1994). “‘You’re not sick,
you’re just in love’: Emotion as an
interpretive system,” in The Nature
of Emotion: Fundamental Questions,
eds P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson
(New York, NY: Oxford University
Press), 32–43.
Tamir, M. (2011). The maturing field
of emotion regulation. Emot. Rev. 3,
3–7.
Thelwall, M., Buckley, K., Paltoglou,
G., Cai, D., and Kappas, A. (2010).
Sentiment strength detection
in short informal text. J. Am.
Soc. Inform. Sci. Technol. 61,
2544–2558.
Thelwall, M., and Wilkinson, D.
(2010). Public dialogs in social net-
work sites: what is their purpose?
J. Am. Soc. Inform. Sci. Technol. 61,
392–404.
Tourangeau, R., and Ellsworth, P.
(1979). The role of the face in the
experience of emotion. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 37, 1519–1531.
Trier, M., and Bobrik, A. (2009).
Exploring and searching social
architectures in digital networks.
IEEE Internet Comput. 23, 51–59.
Uttal, W. R. (2001). The New
Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing
Cognitive Processes in the Brain.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vandekerckhove, M., von Scheve, C.,
Ismer, S., Jung, S., and Kronast, S.
(eds.). (2008). Regulating Emotions:
Social Necessity and Biological
Inheritance. Malden, MA: Blackwell
Publishing.
von Scheve, C. (2012). Emotion regu-
lation and emotion work: two sides
of the same coin? Front. Psychology
3:496. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.
00496
von Scheve, C., and von Luede,
R. (2005). Emotion and social
structures: towards an interdisci-
plinary approach. J. Theory Soc.
Behav. 35, 303–328.
Wierzbicka, A. (2009). Language and
metalanguage: key issues in emotion
research. Emot. Rev. 1, 3–14.
Winkielman, P., and Schooler, J.
(2008). “Unconscious, conscious,
and metaconscious in social cogni-
tion,” in Social Cognition: The Basis
of Human Interaction, eds F. Strack
and J. Foerster (Philadelphia, PA:
Psychology Press), 49–69.
Yurtsever, G., and De Rivera, J. (2010).
Measuring the emotional climate of
an organization. Percept. Mot. Skills
110, 501–516.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 31 July 2012; accepted: 23
January 2013; published online: 15
February 2013.
Citation: Kappas A (2013) Social reg-
ulation of emotion: messy layers. Front.
Psychology 4:51. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2013.00051
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Emotion Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Kappas. This is
an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in other
forums, provided the original authors
and source are credited and subject to any
copyright notices concerning any third-
party graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 51 | 11
